Cyber-physical systems are often safety-critical in that violations of safety properties may lead to catastrophes. We propose a method to enforce the safety of systems with real-valued signals by synthesizing a runtime enforcer called the shield. Whenever the system violates a property, the shield, composed with the system, makes correction instantaneously to ensure that no erroneous output is generated by the combined system. While techniques for synthesizing Boolean shields are well understood, they do not handle real-valued signals ubiquitous in cyber-physical systems, meaning their corrections may be either unrealizable or inefficient to compute in the real domain. We solve the realizability and efficiency problems by analyzing the compatibility of predicates defined over real-valued signals, and using the analysis result to constrain a two-player safety game used to synthesize the shield. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this method on a variety of applications, including an automotive powertrain control system.
I. INTRODUCTION
A cyber-physical system often needs to continuously respond to external stimuli with actions under strict timing and safety requirements; violations of these requirements may lead to catastrophes. While formal verification is desirable, in practice, it can be difficult due to high system complexity, unavailability of source code, and limited capacity of existing verification tools. In addition, many systems have started incorporating machine learning components, which remain challenging to test or verify [13] , [21] .
Bloem et al. [7] recently introduced the concept of shield, denoted S, to enforce a specification ϕ of a system D with certainty. The goal is to ensure that the combined D • S never violates ϕ. If, for example, D malfunctions and produces an erroneous output O for input I, S will correct O into O instantaneously to ensure ϕ(I, O ) holds even when ϕ(I, O) fails. Here, instantaneously means correction is made in the same clock cycle. Furthermore, S depends solely on ϕ, which makes it well-suited for complex D but small ϕ, e.g., learningbased systems [2] , [3] , [42] , [44] .
While the functional specification of D, denoted Ψ, may be large, typically, only a small subset ϕ ⊆ Ψ is safety-critical. Since S depends on ϕ, as opposed to Ψ or D, synthesizing S from ϕ is more practical than model checking [9] , [33] , which decides if D satisfies ϕ, or program synthesis [5] , [6] , [14] , [32] , which creates D from Ψ.
Although techniques for synthesizing Boolean shields are well understood [7] , [22] , [43] , they do not work for systems where signals have real values and need to satisfy constraints such as x + y ≤ 1.53. Naively treating the real-valued constraint as a predicate, or a Boolean variable P , may lead to loss of information at the synthesis time and unrealizability at run time. For example, while the Boolean combination P ∧ ¬Q ∧ ¬R may be allowed, the corresponding real-valued constraint may not have solution, e.g., with P : x + y ≤ 1.53, Q : x < 1.0 and R : y < 1.0.
Even the use of abstraction refinement to combine a Boolean shield with constraint solving does not work. For example, one may be tempted to block P ∧ ¬Q ∧ ¬R and ask the shield to generate a new solution. However, since the shield must be reflexive, i.e., producing O in the same clock cycle when the erroneous O occurs, it may be too slow at run time to recompute a solution. Even if it is fast enough, the new solution may still be unrealizable in the real domain. In general, it is difficult to bound a priori the number of iterations in such an abstraction-refinement loop to meet the strict timing requirement.
We propose a shield synthesis method to guarantee, with certainty, the realizability of real-valued signals. This is accomplished by treating Boolean and real-valued signals uniformly by adding a set of new constraints. These constraints take the form of two automata: a relaxation automaton, to capture the impossible combinations of predicates over signals in I and O, and a feasibility automaton, to capture the infeasible combinations of signals in O . We use them to restrict the synthesis algorithm formulated as a two-player safety game, where the antagonist controls the erroneous O and the protagonist (shield) controls the corrected O : the game is won if the protagonist ensures that ϕ(I, O ) holds even if ϕ(I, O) fails.
The overall flow is shown in Fig. 1 , where the input consists of real-valued I r and O r signals and a safety property ϕ r defined over these signals. Internally, the shield S has three subcomponents: a converter from real-valued I r /O r signals to Boolean To speed up the computation of real values at run time, we also propose a set of design-time optimizations, which leverage the information gathered from the shield to simplify the constraints to be solved at run time. When there are multiple real-valued solutions, the utility function γ shown in Fig. 1 , which defines a robustness criterion, is used to pick the best one. We also propose a two-phase, predict-andvalidate technique to speed up the computation of the realvalued solutions.
We have evaluated the method on a number of applications, including automotive powertrain control [19] , autonomous driving [35] , adaptive cruise control [29] , multi-drone fleet control [30] , generic control [20] , blood glucose control [39] , and water tank control [2] . Our results show that, in all cases, the shield can quickly produce real-valued correction signals at run time. Furthermore, the use of robustness constraints and two-phase computation can significantly improve the quality and efficiency of the real-valued solutions.
To sum up, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a method for synthesizing shields while guaranteeing the realizability of real-valued signals. • We propose optimizations to speed up the computation and improve the quality of these correction signals. • We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed techniques on a number of applications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review the basics of shield synthesis in Section II. Then, we present the technical challenges of extending the Boolean shield to the real domain in Section III. Details of our method for addressing these challenges can be found in Sections IV and V. Next, we present our experimental results in Section VI.
We review the related work in Section VII. Finally, we give our conclusions in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We assume that the system, D, is a blackbox with input I and output O. When D malfunctions, it produces some erroneous values in O. The shield, S, takes both I and O as input and returns O as output. Whenever D |= ϕ, the shield returns O = O; and when D |= ϕ, the shield needs to compute correction O for O. Following Bloem et al. [7] , we treat the correction computation as a two-player safety game.
Safety Game
The antagonist controls the alphabet Σ IO and the protagonist controls the alphabet Σ O . The game is a tuple
is the transition function, and F is the set of unsafe states. In each state g ∈ G, the antagonist chooses a letter σ IO ∈ Σ IO and then the protagonist chooses a letter σ O ∈ Σ O , thus leading to state g = δ G (g, σ IO , σ O ). The resulting state sequence g 0 g 1 ... is called a play. A play is winning for the protagonist when it visits only the safe states.
The game may be solved using the classic algorithm of Mazala [28] , which computes "attractors" for a subset of safe states (G \ F ) and unsafe states F . A winning region W is a subset of (G \ F ) states within which the protagonist has a strategy to win. A winning strategy is a function ω : G × Σ IO → Σ O that ensures the protagonist always wins. The shield S is an implementation of the winning strategy.
where S is a set of states, s 0 is the initial state, δ S : S×Σ IO → S is the transition function, and λ S (S, σ IO ) = σ O is the output function. Here, λ S implements the winning strategy ω in the game G. Assume the system is D = (Q, q 0 , Σ I , Σ O , δ D , λ D ), where Q is the set of system states, q 0 is the initial state, δ D : Q × Σ I → Q is the transition function, and λ D : Example Consider the following two formulas in LTL [31] :
where G means Globally, X means Next, U means Until, Boolean variable A is an input signal, while B 1 and B 2 are output signals of D. Fig. 2 shows the corresponding automaton Fig. 2 . Boolean safety specification. representation, where 0 is the initial state and 2 is an unsafe state. Note that the transition labels are on the edges. Fig. 3 shows the shield generated by existing techniques [7] , [22] , [43] , which takes signals A, B 1 and B 2 as input, and return the modified signals B 1 and B 2 as output. Here, labels are on nodes instead of edges: they are conditions under which transitions go to destination nodes. Furthermore, B 1 = B 1 means the two signals have the same value.
The shield ensures that A, the input signal of D, and B 1 , B 2 , the modified output signals of D, always satisfy the specification in Fig. 2 . At the same time, the deviation between B 1 , B 2 and B 1 , B 2 is minimized.
The red dashed edge in Fig. 3 illustrates a scenario where D violates the specification by setting B 2 to false while moving from a state where A is true to a state where A is false, as represented by the red dashed edge in Fig. 2 . The shield, upon detecting this violation, responds instantaneously by setting B 2 to true. It allows the specification to be satisfied by the modified output (B 2 ). As for B 1 , whose value does not matter, the shield maintains B 1 = B 1 to minimize the deviation.
III. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES Using a Boolean shield to generate real-valued correction signals has two problems: realizability of the Boolean predicates, and quality of the real-valued signals.
A. Realizability of the Boolean Predicates
The Boolean specification in Section II are abstractions of the real-valued LTL properties below, which in turn are abstractions of properties of an automotive powertrain control system [19] expressed in Signal Temporal Logic (STL [27] ). The input signal l denotes the system mode, which may be normal or power. The output signal μ is the normalized error of the air-fuel (A/F) ratio inside an internal combustion engine. Let λ be the A/F ratio and λ ref be a reference value,
Since μ affects other parts of the systems, it must be kept in certain regions depending on the system mode.
The first property says that |μ| should stay below 0.2 in the power mode. The second property says that, after the system changes from the power mode to the normal mode, |μ| should stay below 0.02. In the Boolean versions, A denotes whether the system is in the power mode, while B 1 and B 2 denote |μ| < 0.2 and |μ| < 0.02, respectively. The combination ¬B 1 ∧ B 2 is unrealizable, because |μ| cannot be both greater than 0.2 and less than 0.02.
However, the shield synthesized by existing methods is not aware of this problem, and thus may produce combinations of Boolean values that are not realizable in the real domain. As shown by the red edge in Fig. 3 : if the shield's input is
We solve this problem by checking the compatibility of the predicates at the synthesis time, to guarantee their realizability at run time. Details will be presented in Section IV.
B. Quality of the Real-valued Output
Even if the Boolean values are realizable, the real-valued solution computed by a generic solver may not be of high quality. Assume that all predicates are linear arithmetic constraints, the output of a Boolean shield would be a conjunction of constraints. As shown in Fig. 1 , the back-end may convert O , the Boolean output, to O r , the real-valued output, by solving a linear programming (LP) problem.
Consider G (A ⇒ B) , which abstracts G l = power ⇒ |μ| < 0.2 . Suppose the original system's output violates the property |μ| < 0.2 as shown by the blue line in Fig. 4 , where the two erroneous values are in the middle. The correction computed by an LP solver may be any of the infinitely many values in the interval (-0.2, +0.2), including -0.19 and 0. However, neither of these two values may be acceptable in a real system, which expects the signal to be stable, not arbitrary.
Ideally, we want to generate real-valued signals that are smooth, and consistent with physical laws of the environment, e.g., the green line in Fig. 4 . Toward this end, we leverage a utility function, γ, to impose robustness in addition to correctness constraints. With both types of constraints, the LP solver can generate values of high quality. 
return S bool 14: end function
We also propose a technique to speed up the computation of real values. The intuition is that system dynamics may be approximated using (linear) regression, which predicts the current value of a signal based on its values in the recent past. Thus, we develop a fast runtime prediction unit to guess the value, followed by a fast validation unit to check its validity. If the predicted value is valid, it will serve as the shield's output. Otherwise, we invoke the LP solver. Details will be presented in Section V.
IV. SYNTHESIZING THE BOOLEAN SHIELD
In this section, we present our method for ensuring the realizability of the shield's output signals. The idea is to check the compatibility of predicates inside the game-based algorithm for synthesizing the Boolean shield. To improve efficiency, we check predicate combinations only when they are involved in compute the winning strategy.
Algorithm 1 shows the procedure, where blue highlighted lines address the realizability issue while the remainder follows the classic algorithm in the prior work [7] , [22] , [43] . First, it creates P, the set of predicates from the real-valued specification ϕ r . Then, it uses P to compute a Boolean abstraction of ϕ r , denoted ϕ. Next, it uses ϕ to formulate a two-player safety game G where the antagonist controls I and O, the protagonist controls O , and W is the winning region where the protagonist may win the game.
Since the construction of the safety game G is part of the prior work, we refer to Bloem et al. [7] and Wu et al. [43] for details. Here, it suffices to say that G is a synchronous composition of E, an error-avoiding monitor that outlines all possible ways in which the antagonist may introduce errors in O and the protagonist may introduce corrections in O , and Q, a correctness monitor that ensures ϕ(I, O ) always holds.
Since a winning strategy in W may not be realizable in the real domain, our next step is to compute a strategy ω r based on W while ensuring correction signals produced by ω r are always realizable. Toward this end, we introduce two additional automata: the feasibility automaton F(O ) and the relaxation automaton R(I, O). Specifically, F is used to identify and remove the infeasible edges in ω, i.e., corrections in O with no real-valued solutions. R is used to identify and remove the unrealistic errors in I and O, i.e., errors that are impossible and thus will not occur in the first place.
In other words, F restricts the search to realizable solutions, and R allows us to have more freedom while computing the winning strategy. Thus, the new game G r is a composition of W, R and F. Based on the winning strategy ω r computed from G r , we can construct a shield S bool that is guaranteed to be realizable at run time.
In the remainder of this section, we illustrate the details while focusing on the highlighted lines in Algorithm 1.
A. Computing the Predicates
P is the set of predicates over real-valued signals used in ϕ r , where ϕ r is expressed in Signal Temporal Logic (STL). In addition to the LTL operators, STL also has dense time intervals associated with temporal operators and constraints over real-valued variables.
Consider the STL formulas below, which come from the powertrain control system [19] without modification.
, l is the system mode, and μ is the normalized error of the air-fuel ratio. The first property says that |μ| should stay below 0.2 immediately after the system switch to the power mode, i.e., between time τ s and time T . The second property says that, when it switches from the power mode to the normal mode, |μ| should settle down to below 0.02 after time η and before time ς 2 . To compute P, first, we convert each time interval to a conjunction of linear constraints, e.g., by using a time variable t to represent the bounds in intervals [τ s , T ] and [η,
Next, we convert the constraints over real-valued variables to predicates. From the running example, we will produce the following predicates:
B. Computing the Boolean Abstractions
After the set P of predicates is computed, we use it to compute the Boolean abstractions of ϕ r , I r , O r and O r . This step is straightforward. To compute ϕ from ϕ r , we traverse the abstract syntax tree (AST) of ϕ r and, for each AST node n that corresponds to a real-valued predicate P ∈ P, we replace P with a new Boolean variable v P .
To compute I from I r , we traverse the predicates in P and, for each predicate Q ∈ P defined over some realvalued signals in 
C. Computing the Relaxation Automaton
The relaxation automaton R aims to identify impossible combinations of I and O values, and since they will never occur in the shield's input, there is no need to make corrections in the shield's output. There may be two reasons why a value combination is impossible: 
In addition, our method allows users to provide more constraints to characterize physical laws of the environment or their understanding of the behaviors of the system D.
States in the relaxation automaton R are divided into two types: normal states and impossible states. Here, normal means the I/O behavior of the system D may occur, whereas impossible means it will never occur. Since impossible I/O behavior will never occur in the shield's input, the shield may treat it as don't-care and thus have more freedom to compute the winning strategy.
Example Fig. 5 shows the relaxation automaton for our running example. Here, the dashed edges come from the physical laws (time never travels backward), while the solid edges comes from the compatibility of real-valued predicates defined over l and μ. In particular, the combination ¬M 1 ∧M 2 is identified as impossible, because |μ| cannot be greater than 0.2 and less than 0.02 at the same time.
To check the compatibility of the predicate values, conceptually, one can iterate through all possible value combinations for the predicates in P, and check each combination with an LP solver. If the combination is unsatisfiable (UNSAT) according to the LP solver, we say it is impossible. However, in our actual implementation, the compatibility checking is performed significantly more efficiently, due to the use of variable partitioning and UNSAT cores. First, P may be divided into subgroups, such that predicates from different subgroups do not interfere with each other. Therefore, value combinations may be computed via Cartesian products. Second, when a value combination is proved to be unsatisfiable, we compute its UNSAT core, i.e., a minimal subset that itself is UNSAT. By leveraging these UNSAT cores, we can significantly speed up the checking of value combinations.
D. Computing the Feasibility Automaton
The feasibility automaton F aims to capture the combinations of O values that are unrealizable in the real domain. Similar to R, states in F are divided into two types: normal and infeasible. Here, normal means the value combinations are realizable in the real domain, whereas infeasible means the value combinations may be unrealizable. Fig. 6 shows an example feasibility automaton for the running example: all predicates are the primed versions because they are defined over O signals, which are part of the modified output of the shield. Upon ¬M 1 ∧M 2 , the automaton goes into the infeasible state, because ¬(|μ | < 0.2) ∧ (|μ | < 0.02) has no real-valued solution.
While this is rare, a value combination may depend on realvalued signals not only in the shield's output (O r ) but also in the input (I r ). Let such a value combination be denoted by φ(I r , O r ). Whether φ is guaranteed to be realizable can be decided using an SMT solver, by checking the validity of the formula ∀I r .∃O r .φ(I r , O r ).
Subsequently, during our computation of the winning strategy ω r , we need to avoid such unrealizable combinations.
E. Solving the Constrained Game
The new safety game G r is defined as the composition of W, the winning region of the Boolean game G, the relaxation automaton R, and the feasibility automaton F. We tweak the winning region automaton W by adding an unsafe state for all edges going out of W. Here, composition means the standard synchronous product, where a state transition exists only if it is allowed by all three components (W, R and F). Furthermore, safe states of G r are either (1) states that are both safe in W and feasible in F, or (2) states that are impossible in R.
More formally, assume that F W is the set of unsafe states related to the winning region W, F F is the set of infeasible states of the feasibility automaton F, and F R is the set of the impossible states of the relaxation automaton R. The set of safe states in the new game G r is defined as
Finally, we solve G r using standard algorithms for safety games, e.g., Mazala [28] , which are also used in the prior work [7] , [22] , [43] . The result is a winning strategy ω r , which in turn may be implemented as a reactive component S bool . Note that S bool is a Mealy machine that takes I and O signals as input and returns the modified O signals as output. Furthermore, due to the use of R and F, the output of S bool is guaranteed to be realizable at run time.
V. GENERATING THE REAL-VALUED SIGNALS
In this section, we present our method for computing the real-valued signals (O r ) at run time, based on the Boolean shield's output (O ).
Algorithm 2 shows the details of our method, which needs I r , O r , O r , the set P of predicates, S bool , and a utility function γ, which is used to evaluate the quality of the real-valued Algorithm 2 Computing real-valued correction signals at run time. 
A. Robustness Optimization
Since the output of the Boolean shield is an assignment of the Boolean predicates in O , and each predicate corresponds to a linear constraint of the form Σ k i=1 a i x i ≤ 0, conceptually, the real values in O r can be computed by solving the linear programming (LP) problem.
However, naively invoking the LP solver does not always produce a high-quality solution. Instead, we develop the following optimization to improve the quality of the solution. Specifically, we restrict the LP problem using a robustness constraint derived from the utility function γ. While there may be various ways of defining robustness, especially in the context of STL [12] , [15] , a straightforward way that works in practice is to ensure the signal is smooth (see Fig. 4 ).
That is, we restrict the LP problem using the objective function
where val i denotes the current value (at the i-th time step) and val i−k , where k = 1, 2, . . . , denotes the value in the recent past. The above function aims to minimize the distance between val i and the (moving) average of the previous N values, stored in Hist (Line 13) .
B. Value Prediction and Validation
While the robustness constraint improves the quality of the real-valued solution, it also increases the computational cost of LP solving. To reduce the computational cost, we develop a two-phase optimization for computing the solution.
First, we predict the value of a signal using standard regression algorithms based on the historical values of the signal in the immediate past (Line 7 in Algorithm 2). Here, the procedure PREDICTION leverages historical values stored in Hist. Since the signal is expected to be smooth, standard linear or non-linear regression can be very accurate in practice.
Next, we validate the predicted value (Line 8). This is accomplished by plugging the predicted value for O r into the combination of Boolean predicates defined by P and the values of signals in O . If it is valid, the value is accepted as the final output, and invocation of the LP solver is avoided. Note that the time taken to perform prediction and validation is significantly smaller than that of the LP solving.
Only when the predicted value is not valid, we invoke the LP solver (Line 9). Even in this case, the response time is fast because we can use the same LP solver for validation and LP solving. Due to incremental computation inside the solver, the solution used for validation, which is often close to the final solution, can help speed up LP solving.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We have implemented our method as a tool that takes the automaton representation of a safety specification as input and returns a real-valued shield as output. Internally, we solve the safety game using Mazala's algorithm [28] implemented symbolically using CUDD [1] , and use the LP solver integrated in Z3 [11] for prediction, validation and constraint solving. For evaluation purposes, the shield is implemented as a C program and is executed at every time step. Each execution has two phases: (1) generating Boolean values for signals in O , and (2) generating real values for signals in O r .
Benchmarks
We evaluated our tool on seven sets of benchmarks, including automotive powertrain control [19] , autonomous driving [35] , adaptive cruise control [29] , multidrone fleet control [30] , generic control [20] , blood glucose control [39] , and water tank control [2] . In all benchmarks, the original specification was given in STL, which has both timing and real-valued constraints. Table I shows the benchmark statistics, including the application name, the property, a short description, and the corresponding STL formula. For brevity, we omit the automaton representations. We conducted experiments on a computer with Intel i5 3.1GHz CPU, 8GB RAM, and the Ubuntu 14.04 operating system. Our experiments were designed to answer the following questions: (1) Is our tool efficient in synthesizing the real-valued shield? (2) Is the shield effective in preventing safety violations? (3) Are the real-valued signals produced by the shield of high quality?
Experimental Results Table II shows the results of our shield synthesis procedure. Columns 1-3 show the property name, the number of states of the specification, and the number of realvalued signals in I r and O r , respectively. Column 4 shows the number of predicates defined over signals in I r and O r . Based on these predicates, Boolean signals in I and O are created; Column 5 shows the number of these signals. Column 6 shows the number of conflicting constraints captured by the relaxation and feasibility automata, respectively. Column 7 shows the synthesis time. Columns 8-9 show the number of states of the Boolean shield, and the number of real-valued constraints to be solved at run time. Table III shows the performance of the shields. For each shield, we generated input signals (for I r and O r ) based on the system description: some input signals satisfy the specification while others do not. By measuring the response time of the 
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Having meal within t1 minutes after taking the bolus is safe. A bolus must be taken after t2 minutes of having meal, if it is not yet taken:
Water Tank W1 Turn on inflow and turn off outflow switch when water level is low (l < 4)
Turn on outflow and turn off inflow switch when water level is high (l > 93) shield under these input signals, and the quality of corrections made by the shield, we hope to evaluate its effectiveness. In this table, Column 1 shows the property name. Column 2 shows the size of the C program that implements the shield. Column 3 shows the response time of the Boolean shield on input signals that do not violate the specification. Columns 4-5 show the response time on input signals that violate the specification. Among these columns, prediction means the real-valued solution was successfully computed by a linear regression, whereas constraint solving means prediction failed and the solution was computed by the LP solver.
Overall, the time to compute real-valued correction signals is within 0.5 ms when D |= ϕ, and less than 1 us when D |= ϕ. In the latter case, the shield does not need to make correction at all. In both cases, the response time is always bounded and fast enough for the target applications. 
Case Study 1: Powertrain Control System
To validate the effectiveness of our approach, we integrated the shield into the simulation model of the powertrain control system. Then, we compared the system performance with and without the shield. Fig. 7 shows the simulation results, where our shield was synthesized from the system properties 26, 27, 32, 33 and 34 as described in Jin et al. [19] . Recall that μ is the normalized error of the A/F ratio and μ ref is a reference value. The green dashed line indicates the safe region, which varies as the system switches between different modes (transition events are highlighted with black dotted line). The red dashed line represents violations of the specification by the O r signals. The solid red line represents corrections made in O r . The result shows that our shield can always produce real-valued correction to keep μ in the safe region.
Recall that the goal of using a shield is not to correct the flawed design D itself, which includes the overshot plant; instead, the goal is to avoid the negative impact of D's output. Here, the output signal μ may be used by other components of the system. Fig. 8 shows the simulation results of an autonomous driving system [35] with and without our shield. Here, an ego vehicle is put into a nondeterministic environment that includes an adversarial vehicle, and the two cars are crossing an intersection. The ego vehicle is protected by a shield synthesized from D1+D2 in Table I . The three plots, from top to bottom, are for distances to the intersection, velocities, and accelerations of the two vehicles. The x-axis represents the time in seconds.
Case Study 2: Autonomous Driving
The adversarial vehicle drives straight through the intersection at a constant speed. The ego vehicle, in contrast, may change speed to avoid collision. From t = 0s to t = 5s, since the distance between the two vehicles is large, the ego vehicle maintains a steady speed (set to 2m/s initially). At t = 5s, based on the safety specification, it is supposed to come to a stop (for at least 2s or when there is no collision risk). However, since we injected an error at t = 6s (in red dashed line), there is an unexpected acceleration and, without the shield, there would have been a collision. The blue lines show the behavior of the ego vehicle after corrections are made by the shield. Clearly, its behavior satisfies the requirements: it stops at the intersection to allow the adversarial vehicle to pass safely. Furthermore, the realvalued correction made by the shield is successfully predicted using linear regression, and the predicted values satisfy not only the safety but also the robustness requirements.
VII. RELATED WORK As we have mentioned earlier, prior work on shield synthesis has been restricted to the Boolean domain. Specifically, Bloem et al. [7] introduced the notion of shield together with a synthesis algorithm, which minimizes the deviation between O and O under the assumption that no two errors occur within k steps. Wu et al. [43] improved the algorithm to deal with burst error. That is, if more errors occur within the kstep recovery period, instead of entering a fail-safe state, they keep minimizing the deviation. Könighofer et al. [22] further improved the shield while Alshiekh et al. [2] leveraged it to improve the performance of reinforcement learning. However, none of the existing techniques dealt with the realizability problems associated with real-valued signals.
There is also a large body of work on reactive synthesis [6] , [14] , [32] , [41] and controller synthesis [17] , [24] , [34] , [35] . The goal is to synthesize D from a complete specification Ψ, or the control sequences for D to satisfy Ψ. In both cases, the complexity depends on D. This is a more challenging problem, for two reasons. First, specifying all aspects of the system requirement may be difficult. Second, even if Ψ is available, synthesizing D from Ψ is difficult due to the inherent double exponential complexity of the synthesis problem. Our method, in contrast, treats D as a blackbox while focusing on a small subset ϕ ⊆ Ψ of safety-critical properties. This is why shield synthesis may succeed where conventional reactive synthesis fails.
Renard et al. [36] proposed a runtime enforcement method for timed automata, but assumed that controllable input events may be delayed or suppressed, whereas our method does not require such an assumption. Bauer et al. [4] and Falcone et al. [16] studied various types of temporal logic properties that may be monitored or enforced at run time. Renard et al. [37] also leveraged Büchi games to enforce regular properties with uncontrollable events. Our work is orthogonal in that it tackles the realizability and efficiency problems associated with realvalued signals. Furthermore, we focus on safety while leaving liveness properties and hyper-properties [8] , [10] , [18] for future work.
An important feature of the shield synthesized by our method is that it always makes corrections instantaneously, without any delay. Therefore, it differs from a variety of solutions that allow delayed corrections. In some cases, for example, buffers may be allowed to store the erroneous output temporarily, before computing the corrections [16] , [23] , [40] . In this context, the notion of edit-distance is more relevant. Yu et al. [45] , for example, proposed a technique for minimizing the edit-distance between two strings, but the technique requires the entire input be stored in a buffer prior to generating the output. However, when the buffer size reduces to zero, these existing techniques would no longer work.
Runtime enforcement is related to, but also different from, the various software techniques for error avoidance. For example, failure-oblivious computing [25] , [38] was used to allow software applications to execute through memory errors; temporal properties [26] , [46] were leveraged to control thread schedules to avoid runtime failures of concurrent software. However, these techniques are not designed to target cyberphysical systems with real-valued signals, where corrections are expected to be made instantaneously, i.e., in the same time step when errors occur.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a method for synthesizing real-valued shields to enforce the safety of cyber-physical systems. The method relies on a principled technique at the synthesis time to rule out impossible and infeasible scenarios and ensure the realizability of real-valued corrections at run time. We also proposed optimizations to speed up the computation and improve the quality of the solution. We have evaluated our method on a number of applications, including case studies with an automotive powertrain control system and an autonomous driving system. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of the method in enforcing safety properties of cyber-physical systems.
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